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This study investigates which corporate governance and firm-specific characteristics lead  
firms to be prone to ex-post moral hazard by misallocating the funds that they specifically  
borrowed for financing their R&D activities. We study 106 firms that received a specially  
designed  loan by  a  Turkish  government  to  be  invested  only  in  R&D and technological  
innovations. We find that as the size of the loan increases firms are less prone to moral  
hazard. For family firms our results support  the agency theory.  For large shareholders,  
initially our results are aligned with the agency theory but after controlling for the loan size  
our  results  hold  for  the  stewardship  theory.  We  also  find  that  as  amount  of  the  loans  
increases  relative  to  size  of  firms,  the  performance  of  projects  financed  by  these  loans  
plummets.  Finally,  we show that moral hazard related to R&D and innovation activities  
varies across industries.
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1. Introduction
The  moral  hazard  has  a  potential  to  arise  through  the  information  asymmetry 
between suppliers of funds to Research and Development (R&D) and technological 
innovation  projects2,  and  the  borrowing  firms  owning  these  projects  (Svensson, 
2013).  Here,  the wealth-constrained firm controls the allocation of the borrowed 
funds but  the investment effort  put  to the R&D activities is  unobservable to the 
supplier of funds. This information asymmetry exacerbates the interest asymmetry 
and thus creates moral hazard if insiders divert cash flows from external funds to 
their  own  benefits  instead.  Moreover,  the  information  asymmetry  is  further 
reinforced, as firms are reluctant to reveal the progress of their R&D projects with a  
fear of spillovers to competitors due to non-excludability (Anton and Yao, 1998).  
The  specific  research  objective  of  this  study  is  to  investigate  which  corporate 
governance and firm-specific characteristics lead firms to be prone to ex-post moral 
hazard by misallocating the funds that they specifically borrowed for financing their 
R&D activities. We study 106 firms that have received a specially designed loan by 
Turkish government to be invested in their R&D activities.  Here, the supplier of  
funds is not a profit-seeker agent but a performance-seeking agent. The long-term 
objective of  the government  to lend this  loan is  increasing the performance and 
uniqueness of goods produced in the domestic market and ultimately contributing to 
the solution of the country’s chronic current account deficit problem. Moral hazard 
is a special case of information asymmetry where the decision of one party with 
superior  information  is  at  the  detriment  of  another  after  a  transaction  has  taken 
place. In our case, after this specially designed loan by the government is acquired, 
the  decision to  use  this  loan efficiently  belongs to  the  firm,  which has  superior 
information  and  do  not  carry  the  full  burden  of  potential  losses.  Through 
establishing a link between moral hazard and efficient usage of these loans, we also 
contribute  to  literature  by  testing  the  two  contradictory  theories,  namely 
“stewardship theory” and “agency theory”.
For our study, another factor exacerbating the moral hazard problem is, the loans 
given out to these firms by the Turkish government have longer maturity compared 
to other sources of external finance available to them. However, debt with shorter  
2As  a  definition,  R&D  means  commercializing  a  product  or  production  technology, 
developed through using the knowledge in accordance to the demand from market. Whereas 
technological  innovation  is  related  with  remodelling,  an  already  existing  product  or 
improving a good or service through advancing its ease of usage. Henceforth, R&D will be 
used as term encompassing both R&D and technological innovation activities.  
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maturity requires more frequent negotiations therefore provides more monitoring so 
that  lenders can protect  their  claims from the borrower’s moral  hazard incentive 
(Arslan and Karan, 2006; Aren at al.  2012). Consequently, these loans have less 
potential  to play an effective role in pre-committing investors to punish the low 
efforts of firms. 
To our knowledge, there is no prior study looking at the direct role of moral hazard  
in financing R&D and innovations. The closest to ours is the study by Svensson 
(2013) who focuses on the nature of the contract terms as a remedy for the moral 
hazard arising between owners of the patents and their external financiers.  Other  
studies tackle the moral hazard between entrepreneurs and venture capitalists. Chan 
et  al.  (1990)  explain  the  optimal  transition  of  control  between entrepreneur  and 
venture  capitalist  in  a  model  with  initial  uncertainty  about  the  skill  of  the 
entrepreneur.  Similarly Bergemann and Hege  (1998)  states  that  optimal  contract 
between entrepreneur and venture capitalist should be different from a standard debt 
contract given that entrepreneur’s effort is not verifiable.
Our results show that as the size of the loan increases firms are less prone to moral 
hazard.  For  family  firms,  our  results  support  the  agency  theory.  For  large 
shareholders,  initially  our  results  are  aligned  with  the  agency  theory  but  after  
controlling for the loan size our results hold for the stewardship theory. Finally we 
find  that  as  the  amount  of  loan  increases  relative  to  the  size  of  a  firm,  the 
performance of projects  financed by these loans fall  and the performance varies 
across different industries.
This article is organized as follows; the next section explains the motivation of this  
study  and  builds  hypotheses  within  the  concept  of  moral  hazard.  Section  II 
introduces the data and the methodology of the study whereas Section III discusses 
the results and finally the next section concludes this article.
2. Motivation
The recent speed of growth in capital allocation by both developed and developing 
nations to R&D has increased the importance of providing more insight on these 
activities (Thomas et al. 2011). Firms investing in R&D are found to increase their  
market share and slash their unit production costs and thereby boost productivity and 
efficiency (Yang and Huang, 2013). R&D and innovation activities have broader 
effects than the individual firm level because they not only create a value for the 
firm from which they originate, but also they are important for the other actors that  
interact and cooperate with the firm in the innovation ecosystem (Fisher, 1999). 
As an emerging market,  Turkey globally ranks at the midlevel in terms of R&D 
activities. In specific, as of 2008, the ratio of domestic patent applications to GDP 
(in billions of $) is 2.5 and ranks at 39th out of 40 countries (WIPO, 2010). For the 
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same  year,  the  ratio  of  domestic  patent  applications  to  R&D  expenditures  (in 
millions  of  $)  is  0.4,  ranking  Turkey  23rd out  of  40  countries  (WIPO,  2010). 
However R&D activities of Turkish companies have a particular significance for the 
country’s overall economy given that the high economic growth, which was 9% in 
2010, is fueled by the rising consumption leading to chronic current account deficits  
in  Turkey’s  trade  balance.  R&D  activities  are  a  way  to  boost  the  domestic 
production  in  order  to  feed  the  increasing  domestic  consumption  and  escalate 
exports relative to imports and hence curb the current account deficit.
Previous literature establishes a link between corporate governance structure, and 
R&D expenditures. For example, Baysinger et al. (1991) show that corporate R&D 
strategy is one source of conflict of interest between agents and principals of the  
firms. Specifically, R&D activities are characterized as being high risk-high return 
and hence attractive to principals. However agents are rather reluctant to invest in 
the R&D activities because such innovative projects have a high failure potential 
and  do  not  yield  consistent  returns.  Chung  et  al.  (2003)  also  report  a  positive 
relationship  between  good  corporate  governance  practices  and  efficient  R&D 
investments. Overall, in these studies the moral hazard problem is undertaken as a 
conflict of interests between shareholders (owners) and managers (controllers).
We expect that this specially designed loan provide a good opportunity to test the 
moral hazard between a creditor and a borrowing firm. As indicated by Arslan and 
Umutlu (2005), Turkish SMEs frequently experience borrowing constraints due to 
chronically high level of  real  interest  rates.  Moreover debt maturity of corporate 
sector in Turkey is found by Aydin et al. (2006) to be very short compared to those 
of other emerging economies. Nevertheless, the heavy reliance of Turkish firms on 
short  term  debt  instruments  make  them  vulnerable  to  interest  rates  leading  to 
rollover risk. As indicated in the previous section, these government loans, actually 
granted for the sole purpose of financing projects related with R&D and innovations,  
have relatively longer maturities and subsidized interest rates compared to other debt 
instruments available for our sample firms. For this reason when the companies, 
particularly those that are more prone to incentive problems, receive these loans it is 
likely that they are invested in areas activities that  are not  necessarily related to 
R&D. 
Moral hazard problem is expected to be different for various kinds of firms. Family 
managed firms (henceforth,  family firms)  are  one of  the  most  distinct  corporate 
governance structures. The relationship between family firms and R&D investments 
can be investigated through two conflicting theories;  namely,  stewardship theory 
and  agency  theory.  According  to  the  stewardship  theory,  family  firms  act  with 
altruism for the benefit of the entire organization and its stakeholders (Davis et al,  
1997). Moreover because the reputation and the honor of the family name are tied to 
the continued success of the firm, family firms have an emotional investment in their 
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companies (Bubolz, 2001). If the stewardship theory holds we expect family firms to 
use these specially designed R&D loans more efficiently than the non-family firms, 
because  family  firms  concentrate  on  long  term  survival  and  prosperity  of  the 
company rather than extracting private benefits at the expense of other shareholders.
On  the  contrary,  according  to  the  agency  theory,  management  of  family  firms 
focuses  on  personal  benefits  rather  than  the  impacts  of  their  decision  on  their 
company’s short and long term success. In family firms, managers are the members 
of a controlling family and they are neither closely monitored nor controlled by 
other family members. Furthermore, managers of family firms are not chosen on a 
search for best candidate but on a basis of personal relationships (Brunello, et al.  
2003). For these managers, financial results of the company do not have an impact 
on keeping their jobs (Prencipe et al. 2008). Moreover, La Porta et al. (1999) and 
Claasens et al. (2000) report that corporate governance problems are prevalent in 
family firms in countries with weak legal protection and Turkey is indicated as one  
of them. For this reason, agency conflict in family firms takes place as between 
controlling and the minority shareholders, who can be expropriated by opportunistic 
behavior  of  the  managers/owners  (Morck et  al,  1988).   Consequently,  if  agency 
theory  holds,  our  findings  will  show  that  family  firms  expropriate  shareholder 
wealth through misallocation of resources hence not using these specially designed 
loans efficiently.
Large  shareholders  are  also  one  other  significant  element  of  the  corporate 
governance  structures.  Having  a  dominant  shareholder,  who  as  a  single  person 
maintains a controlling stake in a company, is similar to being a family firm and 
here we also face with the conflicting expectations in regarding the “stewardship 
theory” and “agency theory”.  According to the former theory,  large shareholders 
personally  identify  themselves  with  the  firm  through  internalizing  its  mission 
(Sundaramurthy and Lewis, 2003). We expect that as the percentage of ownership of 
the  largest  shareholder  in  a  firm increases,  the  firm uses  these loans efficiently. 
However, according to the agency theory when ownership is  concentrated in the 
hands of a dominant shareholder, typical governance mechanisms have potential to 
be ineffective.  In  this  case,  the  firms are  exposed to  the  entrenchment  problem, 
which is  a situation that  large shareholders  have the power to pursuit  their  own 
interests rather than those of other shareholders (Morck, 2005). This is called by 
Villalonga  and  Amit  (2006)  as  “Type  II  Agency  Problem”  because  large 
shareholders have more power to control the assets and on the decisions given for 
the  firms,  than  minority  shareholders.  Similarly,  Santos  et  al.  (2013)  provide 
evidence  that  large  shareholders  expropriate  minority  shareholders  through  self-
dealing transactions such as equity, cash flow and asset tunneling.
The last corporate governance structure that we analyze within this context is the 
concentration  of  ownership  by  shareholders,  for  which  the  literature  provides  a 
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considerable support  for the agency theory3.  It  is  widely shown that  relationship 
between  self-disciplinary  mechanisms  and  ownership  concentration  is  positive 
because then incentives of controllers are more aligned. For instance, Baysinger et  
al. (1991) indicate that as the concentration of ownership increases the incentives to 
monitor the managerial innovative efforts rise as well. Aligning with this, Lee and 
O’Neill (2003) find that stock concentration is positively related to the R&D to sales 
ratio in US firms. We expect a positive relationship between performance of the 
projects financed with these loans and ownership concentration in a firm given that  
agents  will  have  less  power  for  opportunistic  behavior  and  excessive  perk 
consumption.
We also control for the size of the loan granted to a firm in order to engage in R&D 
activities. Jaffee and Stiglitz (1990) state that loan size chosen by the lender directly  
affect borrower behavior, and in our case this is the moral hazard. Khalil and Parigi  
(1998) indicate that as the amount of loan granted increases, the ability of lenders to  
enforce compliance with the terms of the contract strengthens and this obliges the  
firm to use the loan efficiently.  We hypothesize that as the loan size increases firms 
utilize these loans in more R&D efficient areas.
Van Osnabrugge (2000)  identifies  the  importance of  industry  sector  in  terms  of 
agency-theory based analysis given that R&D activities significantly differ across 
industries. Therefore we also incorporate industry specification of companies to our 
estimations given that every industry is under a different market structure, which 
determines the severity of moral hazard. Specifically, firms in industries with more 
competitive market structures are expected to be less engaged in extracting private  
benefits.
Lastly, in our analyses we study how moral hazard is related with being either a 
limited liability company (LLC) or a sole proprietorship. In LLCs, owners of the 
companies are not responsible to the liabilities of the firm with their personal assets.  
Whereas, sole proprietorship is a business owner and when the firm fails creditors 
are entitle to force the sale of not only the business property but also the owner’s 
personal  assets  to  satisfy  their  claims.  Therefore,  there  is  no  legal  distinction 
between personal assets of sole proprietorship and liabilities of the business. We 
expect  to  reach  to  differing  results  in  terms  of  moral  hazard  between  sole 
proprietorship and LLCs.
3. Data and Methodology
3 See Zhang (1998) for a broad review on how ownership concentration is related with the 
agency theory.
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The source of the data for this study is 749 firms, which received these R&D loans 
by  Technology  Development  Foundation  of  Turkey  (TTGV;  Türkiye  Teknoloji 
Geliştirme  Vakfı)  between  the  years  1991  and  2009.  TTGV  is  a  non-profit 
organization founded in 1991 through an international loan agreement between the 
Turkish  government  and  the  World  Bank.  These  loans  are  granted  under  the 
classifications  of  R&D supports,  innovations  and  technological  entrepreneurship 
supports. TTGV accepts loan applications from domestic firms twice a year and the 
granted loans may total up to $1,000,000 with a stipulation that firms also put a 
certain amount of cash commitments to their projects as well. The duration of the 
project is not expected to exceed two years and the repayment of the loan to TTGV 
is required to be completed in 3.5 years. At the end of the investment period the  
borrowing firms are inspected by the experts of TTGV. 
Intuitively,  initial  number of 749 available observations is higher than the actual 
number of borrowing firms due to the fact that some firms are likely to be supported 
for multiple projects. After controlling for the multiple borrowings, total number of 
observations  further  reduces  to  547  because,  additionally,  some  firms  that  are 
liquidated, taken over or acquired are eliminated. Due to inconsistencies in data, and 
after truncating the extreme values, observation window is narrowed to the period 
starting from 2004 and ending at 2008 and therefore total number of target firms is 
further reduced to 197 firms. These firms are lent these loans by TTGV either in 
2004 or 2005. The corporate governance and firm-specific data, which constitute the 
independent variables in our analyses) of these firms are obtained through fax and e-
mail and the response rate is 54 %, which caused the total number of observations to 
fall to 106 firms. 
It  is  indicated  by  Hashimoto  and  Haneda  (2008)  that  the  major  difficulty  in 
measuring the success of R&D and innovative activities is due to the fact that while 
resource inputs can clearly be identified, it is difficult to choose the key outputs.  
Therefore, we construct a dependent variable that is an aggregation of ten distinct 
proxies for output success.  A firm is scored on each of the ten criteria, on an integer  
scale from 1 to 5, according to how well it  used this specially designed loan by 
TTGV towards its R&D and innovation activities for the criterion involved. So, the 
dependent variable can be considered as a measure of the average performance by a 
firm in transforming its loan into successful R&D and innovation. This standard 
scaling was performed on TTGV to firms that borrowed this loan either in 2004 or  
2005,  based  on  2008  data.  The  scaling  is  conducted  by  our  co-author  Hakan 
Özdemir,  who is  an  inspector for  the  TTGV and whose  expertise  is  in  making 
decisions about firms’ success. 
The scores of the ten indicators are aggregated into one measure that has an integer  
value from 1 to 5, rounding to the nearest whole number when necessary, in order to 
avoid imputing more accuracy to the summary measure than is actually the case. 
118 European Research Studies, XVII (4), 2014O. Arslan-Ayaydin, D. Barnum, M.B. Karan, A.H. Ozdemir
This  summary  measure  of  a  firm’s  performance  in  utilizing  the  loan  in  its  
R&D/innovations investments serves as the dependent variable in the regressions in 
this article.  
Because  this  dependent  variable  is  a  proxy  for  a  firm’s  efficient  use  of  the 
government loan, its expected value will be lower for those firms characterized by 
factors that increase moral hazard. For example, if it were the case that firms with a  
single individual owning the majority of the equity are found to have lower scores 
on the dependent variable than expected by chance, then we could conclude that 
firms under the majority control of one person face a higher moral hazard than those 
not so classified. That is, since the dependent variable measures a firm’s success in  
utilizing  a  loan  to  improve  its  R&D performance,  then  firm  characteristics  that 
decrease the estimated value of the dependent variable to a statistically significant 
degree would indicate that such characteristics increase moral hazard.
The ten criteria and specifications for placing each on a scale of 1 to 5 are shown in  
Appendix 1, and the actual values assigned are shown in Appendix 2.  According to 
this table, having a mean value of 2.777 of a scale of 1 to 5, firms in our dataset are  
moderately successful in utilizing these loans as stipulated.
Table 1. Detailed Statistics about Sample Firms
Variables Mean
Standard 
Deviation Minimum Maximum
Loan Performance 2.777 1.441 1 5
Loan Size 278,867.10 222,987.10 29,013 994,417
LS/TA 0.175 0.110 0.001 0.624
Family Firm 0.359 0.482 0 1
Large Shareholder 0.566 0.242 0.1632 1
Concentration 4.825 6.004 1 57
LLC 0.340 0.476 0 1
Technology 0.136 0.344 0 1
Notes: This  table  provides detailed statistics  about  106 firms that  we analyze in  this  study.  Loan 
Performance is a scale ranging from 1 to 5, the firms using the loans least efficiently takes the value of 
1 and the ones that use the loan the most efficiently takes the value of 5.  Loan Size is the amount of 
loan granted to a firm in either 2004 or in 2005 and it is denominated in Turkish Lira. LS/TA is the ratio 
of the loan size to the total assets of the firm. Family Firm is a dummy variable taking the value of 1 if 
a  family  member  is  a  controller  of  the  firm  and  zero  otherwise.  Large  Shareholder shows  the 
ownership percentage of the largest shareholder of the company. Concentration is the total number of 
shareholders in a company. LLC is a dummy variable taking the value of zero if a firm is a limited  
liability company and one if a firm is a sole proprietorship.  Technology is another dummy variable 
taking the value of 1 if the firm is located the technological development area and zero otherwise.
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Table 1 provides detailed statistics about the firms in our data set.  Loan Size is the 
amount of loan granted to a firm in either 2004 or in 2005 and it is denominated in  
USD. The standard deviation of the  Loan Size variable shows that there is large 
variation in the value of loans granted to firms.  For that  reason we include,  the 
variable  LS/TA, which measures the ratio of the loan size to the total assets of the 
firm. As for corporate governance attributes, most of the firms in our data set are not 
family firms and the average percentage of ownership by the dominant shareholder, 
which  is  shown  as  the  Large  Shareholder  and  measured  as  the  percentage  of 
shareholder  of  the  largest  shareholder  in  a  company,  is  around 57% and finally 
Concentration stands for the ownership concentration in a firm, measured by the 
number of shareholders in a firm and its average value is around 5 with a relatively 
high standard deviation4. 
Our results also show that around 66% of firms in our sample is sole proprietorship. 
Furthermore, Technology is another dummy variable taking the value of 1 if the firm 
is located the technological  development area  and zero otherwise.  Technological 
development areas in Turkey are designated as the ones where firms only engage in 
business  activities  related with R&D and technological  innovations.  These firms 
take  advantage  of  supports,  subventions  and  tax  exemptions  from  the  local 
government,  and  these  advantages  play  a  considerable  role  in  decreasing  their 
operating leverage. However the activities of firms located in these areas are also 
under  a  more  scrutiny  and  monitoring  by  government  and  hence  we  expect  a 
positive (negative) association between having been located in the area and the R&D 
performance (moral hazard). The table shows that around 14% of the firms in our 
data set are located in the technological development areas in Turkey . Intuitively, 
intensity of the R&D activities of firms differs in accordance to which industry they 
are in. The highest number of firms in our data set belongs to the machinery and  
equipment  industry,  followed  by  electric  &  electronic,  software,  materials, 
chemicals and finally bio-agriculture industries. The year of the observation for each 
variable is 2008 except for the Loan Size and LS/TA, which belong to years 2004 or 
2005 depending on the date when the loan is granted.
4 Our multivariate results still hold when ownership concentration is measured as the sum of 
ownership percentages of the highest three owners.
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Table 2.Correlation Coefficient across Variables
Loan
Per/nce
Bio-
Agro
E&E Softwa
re
Chemistry Mach-Eq. LLC Tech. Family 
Firm
Conct. Large 
Shrhldr
Loan 
Size
LS/TA Materials
Loan 
Performance
1.00
Bio-Agro 0.17 1.00
E&E 0.01 -0.15 1.00
Software -0.14 -0.15 -0.26 1.00
Chemistry 0.05 -0.09 -0.16 -0.16 1.00
Mach-Eq. 0.16 -0.12 -0.20 -0.20 -0.13 1.00
LLC -0.11 0.02 -0.11 -0.06 -0.15 0.13 1.00
Technology -0.04 -0.12 -0.06 -0.64 -0.13 -0.16 -0.17 1.00
Family Firm -0.14 0.01 0.07 -0.27 -0.02 0.18 0.28 -0.18 1.00
Conct. 0.08 -0.06 -0.07 0.16 -0.02 0.01 -0.27 0.27 -0.14 1.00
Large 
Shareholder
-0.016 0.03 -0.09 -0.06 -0.10 0.08 0.28 0.03 -0.06 -0.19 1.00
Loan Size 0.25 -0.11 0.08 0.07 0.04 -0.10 -0.28 0.34 -0.11 0.03 -0.06 1.00
LS/TA -0.26 -0.11 -0.07 0.24 -0.14 -0.04 0.13 0.04 -0.06 -0.10 0.11 0.07 1.00
Materials 0.16 -0.12 -0.21 -0.20 -0.12 -0.25 0.09 -0.15 0,17 0.13 0.07 -0.09 -0.08 1.00
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Notes: This table provides correlation coefficients across variables belonging to 106 firms that we analyze in this study. Loan Performance is a scale ranging from 1 to 5, the 
firms using the loans least efficiently takes the value of 1 and the ones that use the loan the most efficiently takes the value of 5. Loan Size is the amount of loan granted to a firm 
in either 2004 or in 2005 and it is denominated in Turkish Lira. LS/TA is the ratio of the loan size to the total assets of the firm. Family Firm is a dummy variable taking the value 
of 1 if a family member is a controller of the firm and zero otherwise.  Large Shareholder shows the ownership percentage of the largest shareholder of the company. Conct. 
stands for the concentration of ownership and is measured as the total number of shareholders in a company.  LLC is a dummy variable taking the value of zero if a firm is a 
limited liability  company and one if  a firm is a sole proprietorship.  Technology is another dummy variable taking the value of 1 if  the firm is  located the technological 
development area and zero otherwise. Bio-Agro is a dummy variable taking the value of 1 if the firm belongs to the bio-agriculture industry and zero otherwise. E&E is a dummy 
variable taking the value of 1 if the firm belongs to the electric-electronic industry and zero otherwise. Software is a dummy variable taking the value of 1 if the firm belongs to 
the software industry and zero otherwise. Chemistry is a dummy variable taking the value of 1 if the firm belongs to the chemistry industry and zero otherwise. Mach-Eq is a 
dummy variable taking the value of 1 if the firm belongs to the machine-equipment industry and zero otherwise. Materials is a dummy variable taking the value of 1 if the firm 
belongs to the materials industry and zero otherwise.
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Table 2 shows the correlation matrix across the variables in our analyses and there is 
not a multi-co linearity problem across our variables.
3. Results
Table 3 shows the three regression equations that we estimate, and the results for our 
analyses.   In  all  three  regressions,  we  use  Huber-White  sandwich  estimator  for 
robust variance-covariance estimations and in order to correct for heteroskedasticity.
Table 3.Regression Results
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Independent Variables Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient
Constant 2.745*** 2.704*** 3.553***
(5.48) (5.22) (6.12)
Loan Size 0.001*** 0.001*** -0.001
(3.83) (3.24) (-0.71)
Loan Size/Total Assets -1.110*** -1.120** -0.884**
(-2.61) (-2.56) (-2.13)
Family Firm -0.619** -0.517 -0.633**
(-2.20) (-1.24) (-2.31)
Family Firm*Loan Size -0.001
(-0.38)
Large Shareholder -0.91* -0.918 -2.575***
(-1.73) (-1.43) (-2.98)
Large Shareholder*Loan Size 0.001***
(2.51)
Concentration 0.013 0.013 0.011
(0.72) (0.71) (0.56)
LLC 0.234 0.239 0.303
(0.72) (0.73) (0.96)
Technology -0.387 -0.371 -0.410
(-0.73) (-0.68) (-0.79)
Materials 1.020** 1.029** 1.209***
(2.19) (2.19) (2.60)
Bio-Agro 1.168* 1.160* 1.288**
(1.96) (1.93) (2.36)
E&E 0.211 0.207 0.174
(0.62) (0.61) (0.53)
Software -0.052 -0.438 0.051
(-0.10) (-0.09) (0.10)
Chemistry 0.214 0.209 0.323
(0.40) (0.39) (0.62)
R2 0.29 0.28 0.31
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This table provides regression results belonging to 106 firms that we analyze in this 
study.  We use  Huber-White  sandwich  estimator  for  robust  variance-covariance 
estimations and in order to correct for heteroskedasticity. Loan Performance is the 
dependent variable in the regression a scale ranging from 1 to 5, the firms using the 
loans least efficiently takes the value of 1 and the ones that use the loan the most  
efficiently takes the value of 5. Loan Size is the amount of loan granted to a firm in 
either 2004 or in 2005 and it is denominated in Turkish Lira. LS/TA is the ratio of 
the loan size to the total assets of the firm. 
Family Firm is a dummy variable taking the value of 1 if a family member is a 
controller of the firm and zero otherwise. Large Shareholder shows the ownership 
percentage of the largest shareholder of the company. 
Concentration is the total number of shareholders in a company. LLC is a dummy 
variable taking the value of zero if a firm is a limited liability company and one if a  
firm is a sole proprietorship. 
Technology is another dummy variable taking the value of 1 if the firm is located 
the  technological  development  area  and  zero  otherwise.  Bio-Agro is  a  dummy 
variable taking the value of 1 if the firm belongs to the bio-agriculture industry and 
zero otherwise. E&E is a dummy variable taking the value of 1 if the firm belongs 
to the electric-electronic industry and zero otherwise. Software is a dummy variable 
taking  the  value  of  1  if  the  firm  belongs  to  the  software  industry  and  zero 
otherwise. Chemistry is a dummy variable taking the value of 1 if the firm belongs 
to the chemistry industry and zero otherwise.
 Materials is a dummy variable taking the value of 1 if the firm belongs to the 
materials industry and zero otherwise. For the industry variables,  the base (and 
therefore omitted variable to which the others are compared) is  Machinery and 
Equipment, t-statistics are reported in parenthesis. The year of the observation for 
each variable is 2008 except for the  Loan Size and LS/TA, which belong to years 
2004 or 2005 depending on the date when the loan is granted. *, ** and *** denote 
significance levels at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively.
Our results show that as the loan size increases the firms become less prone to moral 
hazard and use the loans efficiently. Our results align with those of Khalil and Parigi 
(1988) because we find that as the amount of loan increases the firms become more 
obliged  to  abide  by  the  terms  of  the  contract  because  increased  loan  amount 
encourages  the  monitoring by the lender  and this  in  turn ameliorates  the  firm’s 
moral  hazard problem through inducing the firm to engage in  efficient  projects.  
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Besides, higher is the loan amount higher is the interest cost for the loan, which 
depletes the benefits of moral hazard of the borrower. 
We also find that the larger is the size of the loan that a firm is granted relative to the 
total assets of the firm the less efficient is the project. This result suggests that the  
most efficient projects were produced with large government loans to large firms. In 
other  words the smaller  firms become are  more inclined to  moral  hazard as the 
amount of loan they are granted increase. 
Our results for both the family firm and having a dominant shareholder in a firm 
support the agency theory, instead of the stewardship theory. First of all we find that  
being a family firm is negatively associated with the performance. For that reason 
family firms are found to be more prone to opportunistic behaviors at the expense of 
shareholders and hence myopic in allocation of the borrowed funds. Furthermore, 
despite  not  having  a  statistically  strong significance,  large  shareholders  are  also 
more  inclined  to  moral  hazard  as  the  relationship  between  the  variable  and 
performance scale is found to be negative. 
For the concentration of ownership, which is another corporate governance attribute 
in our analyses, we do not find a statistically significant result. This finding offers 
that  the  relationship  between  moral  hazard  and  R&D  investments  cannot  be 
explained through the concentrated or dispersed ownership structure of these firms.
According  to  the  2010  report  of  Turkish  Council  of  Science  and  Research 
(TUBITAK, 2010) machinery-equipment industries give the highest  emphasis on 
R&D activities and this industry is ranked as the first in Turkey in R&D capacity.  
For this reason, in our analyses machinery-equipment industry is used as the base,  
and the coefficients for the other industries measure the difference in performance 
between machinery-equipment and the industry involved.  Our results show that the 
mean efficiencies are greater than the machinery equipment industry for only two 
industries,  namely,  materials  and  bio-agriculture  whereas  with  the  others  not 
different from the machinery-equipment industry to a statistically significant degree. 
In  other  words,  firms  in  the  materials  and,  to  a  certain  extent,  bio-agriculture  
industries are found to be R&D efficient and less associated with moral hazard. This 
result reflects the fact that competitive pressure has a potential to reduce the moral  
hazard problem (Nygaard and Myrtveit,  2000). Competition in materials industry 
(any materials used in building, construction, mining, handling) in Turkey is fiercer 
due to heavy pressure of imports from foreign producers and therefore there is a 
higher requirement to resort to R&D activities in order to decrease unit production 
costs, create a relatively unique product and maintain the market share.  
Moreover, materials  industry is the most sensitive to economic cycles given that 
materials are the primary input for the industry sector. Altogether, R&D activities 
are  helpful  in  decreasing  the  price  elasticity  of  demand  for  the  outputs  of  this 
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industry.  Besides,  in  the  bio-agriculture  sector,  there  is  also a  high value added 
through creating  a  unique  product  through  R&D investments,  and  this  situation 
makes the moral hazard more costly for these firms in our case. Bio-  agricultural 
industry has considerable biological science (molecular biology involving genomics, 
proteomics,  recombinant  DNA,  and  supporting  informatics  technologies)  at  its 
foundation,  making  the  industry  more  open  to  R&D  activities.  Moreover, 
agricultural sector has a significant role in the Turkey’s economy with an annual  
share of 12 % of the GNP between  2001-2005 (Ozer et al. 2008). However, for the 
rest of the industries, namely; electric-electronic, software and chemicals we do not 
detect a higher R&D performance.
Our results  show that,  at  odds with our initial  expectations,  firms located in the 
technological development areas are not found to be more R&D efficient than the  
firms that are not located in these areas. Lastly, there is no statistically significant 
impact  of  being either a  sole proprietorship or a  LLC, in  which owners are  not  
responsible  to  the  liabilities  of  the  firm  with  their  personal  assets,  on  R&D 
performance. In order to further enhance the discussion of our results, in Model 2 we 
take an interaction between family firms and the loan size with an aim to see if  
moral hazard in the family firms still persists as the amount of the borrowed loans 
increases. Here we aim to see if firms still experience an agency threat called as self-
control (Jensen, 1998), which is the case when owner managers have incentive to 
take actions that is likely to harm themselves as well as those around them, despite 
the loan size grows. However the interaction variable is found to be statistically 
insignificant and hence does not enable us to conclude that these loans themselves 
impose a discipline on family firms. 
In  Model  3,  this  time  we  take  interaction  between  the  loan  size  and  the  large 
shareholder, in order to find out if the amount of loan plays a disciplinary role on the 
dominant shareholder to take long term oriented and value-enhancing actions for 
shareholders, in order words lead them to invest these loans in R&D efficient areas. 
This time, our model shows that interaction term in our regression becomes positive 
and statistically significant. As the amount of the loan increases large shareholders 
become less prone the moral hazard and more disciplined not to pursuit their own 
interests at the expense of other shareholders. Therefore after controlling the loan 
size we find a support for stewardship theory for large shareholders given that as the 
amount of the borrowed loan increases Type II agency costs disappears because the 
dominant shareholders are now motivated by altruism and loyalty.
4. Discussion
Given the importance of corporate innovation, there needs to be a clarification on 
the factors that affect a firms’ performance in R&D investments, which determines 
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the increase in firm value. However, allocation of funds to R&D investments does 
not necessarily lead to higher value if moral hazard is in place. Innovation activities  
are highly uncertain and skewed. The presence of information asymmetry between 
suppliers  of  funds  to  R&D  activities  and  the  borrowing  firms  leads  us  to  link 
corporate governance to R&D investment outcomes5. 
As indicated by Hwang et al. (2012), studying the impact of moral hazard on R&D 
performance in an emerging market setting is particularly important given that these 
countries have a weaker tradition for law and order for the protection of shareholder 
and creditor  rights.  Shleifer  and  Vishny (1997)  show that  corporate  governance 
concepts are influenced by a country’s institutional framework such as bankruptcy 
laws,  legal  protection  of  investor  and  minority  rights,  control  by  financial 
institutions and restrictions on managerial self-dealing.  It is now generally agreed 
that the lessons one can draw from various U.S.-based studies are not necessarily  
applicable  to  other  countries  (Claessens  et  al.,  2002).  By  contrast,  in  emerging 
markets, such as Turkey, large shareholders have higher likelihood to pursue their 
own  interests  at  the  expense  of  other  stakeholders,  and  family  firms  are  more 
common. Therefore, agency costs affecting US firms are significantly different from 
those affecting emerging markets.6 
Especially for family firms, our results contradict to what is suggested by Munari et  
al (2010) that the context of suppliers of external finance moderates the relationship 
between corporate governance practice of companies and their R&D investments. 
Specifically,  our  results  on  family  firms  align  with  how Perez-Gonzalez  (2006) 
associates  them  with  nepotism  and  managerial  entrenchment.  Therefore,  family 
utility  maximization through these loans is  opposed to firm value maximization. 
Similarly, Block (2012) also finds for US firms that family ownership causes agency 
costs, leading to lower R&D intensity. 
According  to  the  results,  we  find  that  loan  size  is  positively  associated  with 
performance of the supported projects. While small-scale R&D projects are easier to 
manage,  large-scale  ones  require  using  a  more  structured  project  management 
methodology. This better management helps to decrease the risk of moral hazard 
and increases the performance of the project. Vice versa, firms having better project 
5 The objective of this study to link corporate governance issues to R&D efficiency is further  
boosted  by  the  recent  policy  debate  pointing  at  the  persistence  of  high  executive 
remuneration packages while weak propensity in Europe to invest in R&D after the 2008 
crisis (van Pottelsberghe, 2011).
6
 See, Minetti (2011) et al. for further discussion.
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management  capabilities  are  more  willing  to  apply  for  and  handle  large-scale 
projects.
Another striking finding is that as amount of the loan increases relative to size of a 
firm, the performance of a project financed by these loans decreases. In other words, 
loan size no longer functions to mitigate conflicts  of  interests  when it  excessive 
relative to a firm’s size. This may be explained by the increased risk tolerance of the 
firms. Firms having financial difficulties tend to engage in more  risky projects (or 
projects that they may not pursue under normal circumstances) in order to get more 
returns, thus trying to recover faster. In that case, they are also willing to acquire  
more debt. However, we are unable to test this prediction due to unavailability of 
data related to financial problems experienced by our sample firms. Therefore we 
recommend the test of the relationship between financial constraints and the ratio of 
loan amount to firm size as an avenue for further research.
5. Conclusion
In a recent study by Sapra et al (2014) it is emphasized that the theoretical literature 
on  innovation  choices  of  firms  through  the  corporate  governance  is  still  
undeveloped.  The  objective  of  this  study  is  to  shed  a  light  on  the  association 
between the concept of moral hazard and efficient usage of funds aimed at R&D and 
technological innovation activities of firms from an emerging market. This way we 
also complement the study of Gugler (2001) indicating that information asymmetry 
about R&D projects may discourage creditors from financing innovation activities. 
To do this we study 106 firms that are granted with a specially designed loan by 
TTGV to be invested only for their R&D activities.  
Overall our analysis provides evidence that corporate governance is a driving force 
of a firm’s efficient use of these loans. Our initial results lend support to the “agency 
theory” through family firms and large shareholders, both of which may influence 
decisions that foster their personal profit or utility but neglect or even harm minority 
shareholders,  yet it is inconclusive for the ownership concentration. We find that 
loan size is positively associated with performance of the supported projects. After 
controlling for the loan size for family firms and large shareholders, our results lend 
considerable support that “agency theory” persists for family firms yet this time the 
results  hold  for  the  “stewardship  theory”  for  firms  with  dominant  shareholders. 
When the amount of loan is scaled to the total assets of a firm, we find that as the 
loan size increases relative to the size of a firm and then firms become more prone to 
moral hazard. We also find that firms in the materials and bio-agriculture industries  
are more efficient in using these loans in R&D projects. Interestingly, being located 
in the technologically supported region has no significant impact on the performance 
of  loans.  Finally,  we  do  not  find  a  distinction  between  being  a  LLC  and  sole 
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proprietorship in terms of the relationship between moral hazard and the outcome of 
the R&D investments.
        APPENDIX
1. Performance Criteria
1.  Project’s objective remained consistent from star t to end
1      The objective became completely different
2      The objective became substantially different
3      don’t know
4      The objective remained substantially the same
5      The objective remained completely the same
2.  Changes that occurred in the implementation process were ______
1      completely unjustified
2      substantially unjustified
3      don’t know
4      substantially justified
5      completely justified
3.  Actual costs were _____ than the proposed costs
1      much higher
2      somewhat higher
3      about the same
4      somewhat lower
5      much lower
4 . The project was successfully completed
1      completely false
2      mainly false
3      don’t really know
4      mainly true
5      completely true
5.  The results of the project were disseminated
1      not at all
2      only a minor  amount
3      not a lot, not a little
4      a fairly substantial amount
5      widely disseminated
6.  The project results can be commercialized
1      not at all
2      only to a minor  degree
3      more than a little, less than a lot
4      to a reasonably substantial degree
5      to a great degree
7.  As a result of the project firm sales were
1      much lower
2      a little lower
3      about the same
4      a little higher
5      much higher
8.  As a result of the project firm costs were
1      much higher
2      a little higher
3      about the same
4      a little lower
5      much lower
9.  As a result of the project the firm’s net income was
1      much lower
2      a little lower
3      about the same
4      a little higher
5      much higher
10.  As a result of the project, the firm’s market share was
1      much lower
2      a little lower
3      about the same
4      a little higher
5      much higher
128 European Research Studies, XVII (4), 2014O. Arslan-Ayaydin, D. Barnum, M.B. Karan, A.H. Ozdemir
2. Performance Estimation Data
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
1 2 3 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
2 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5
3 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
4 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5
5 3 4 2 4 2 3 2 3 4 3 3
6 3 3 3 2 3 4 3 2 4 4 2
7 4 4 3 5 4 3 4 5 4 4 4
8 3 2 4 3 2 2 4 4 3 3 3
9 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
10 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
11 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
12 3 4 3 4 3 4 3 3 2 2 2
13 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
14 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
15 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
16 4 5 4 4 5 4 4 3 3 4 4
17 3 3 3 4 3 2 3 2 4 3 3
18 3 4 4 3 4 3 3 3 2 2 2
19 3 2 2 3 4 3 3 4 3 4 2
20 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4
21 2 1 2 1 3 1 3 2 3 2 2
22 3 5 5 3 3 1 2 2 3 3 3
23 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5
24 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
25 2 1 1 2 2 2 2 3 3 2 2
26 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
27 3 4 3 4 4 2 3 3 2 3 2
28 4 4 4 3 5 4 5 3 4 3 5
29 2 3 2 3 2 2 2 2 1 2 1
30 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
31 2 2 2 3 2 1 2 1 3 2 2
32 4 4 4 3 5 4 5 4 3 4 4
33 3 3 3 4 3 3 3 3 2 3 3
34 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
35 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
36 2 2 2 3 3 1 2 2 3 1 1
37 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
38 3 2 2 4 3 3 4 3 3 3 3
39 2 3 3 1 3 2 2 1 1 2 2
40 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
41 3 3 4 4 3 2 2 3 3 3 3
42 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
43 3 2 3 3 2 3 4 3 4 3 3
44 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5
45 4 5 4 4 4 4 4 3 5 4 3
46 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
47 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
48 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5
49 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5
Loan Efficiency Criterion NumberMean Criteria 
Value
Project
 Number 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
51 4 4 5 3 5 5 4 3 3 4 4
52 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
53 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
54 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5
55 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5
56 4 5 4 4 4 3 4 5 3 4 4
57 4 4 4 4 5 4 3 4 3 4 5
58 3 4 3 3 4 3 3 2 2 3 3
59 2 2 2 1 2 3 3 2 1 2 2
60 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5
61 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5
62 3 4 3 3 3 2 3 3 3 3 3
63 3 3 3 4 3 3 3 3 4 2 2
64 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
65 3 2 3 2 3 3 3 3 3 4 4
66 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
67 4 5 5 4 5 3 4 3 4 4 3
68 2 2 2 1 1 3 2 3 2 2 2
69 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
70 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
71 3 3 3 2 3 3 4 3 3 3 3
72 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5
73 2 2 2 1 2 2 3 2 2 2 2
74 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
75 2 3 3 1 2 1 1 2 3 2 2
76 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5
77 2 2 3 2 1 1 3 2 2 2 2
78 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
79 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
80 3 3 5 2 3 2 3 2 4 3 3
81 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
82 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
83 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5
84 3 4 2 2 3 2 3 3 4 3 4
85 4 5 5 3 4 3 5 3 4 4 4
86 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5
87 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
89 3 4 4 3 4 2 3 2 2 3 3
90 4 5 4 5 4 3 4 3 4 4 4
91 2 2 2 2 2 1 1 3 3 2 2
92 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
93 3 4 3 3 4 2 3 3 3 2 3
94 3 3 3 4 4 3 3 3 2 2 3
95 2 2 1 2 3 2 2 1 3 1 3
96 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5
97 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5
98 4 4 5 5 4 3 4 3 4 4 4
99 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5
101 3 2 3 4 3 4 3 2 3 2 4
102 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5
103 3 4 4 3 4 2 3 2 2 3 3
104 3 3 3 2 3 4 3 3 3 3 3
105 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
106 4 5 4 5 5 2 4 3 4 3 5
Project
 Number
Mean Criteria 
Value
Loan Efficiency Criterion Number
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